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Accelerating progress to implement effective alcohol policies is necessary to achieve multiple 
targets within the WHO’s Global Strategy to Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol and the 
Sustainable Development Goals. Yet, the alcohol industry’s role in shaping alcohol policy 
through international avenues, such as trade fora, is poorly understood. We investigate whether 




We studied discussions on alcohol health-warning labelling policies at WTO’s Committee on 
Technical Barriers to Trade from 2010-2019 using written meeting minutes (n=83 documents). 
We identified instances where WTO members indicated that their statements represented 
industry. We further developed and applied a taxonomy of industry rhetoric to identify whether 
WTO member statements advanced arguments made by industry in domestic forums.   
 
Findings 
WTO members made 212 statements on ten alcohol labelling policy proposals. Statements 
featured many arguments used by industry to stall alcohol policy at the domestic level. They 
included de-scaling and re-framing the nature and causes of alcohol-related problems, promoting 
alternative policies such as information campaigns and industry partnerships. WTO members 
stated that their claims represented industry in 3.3% of statements, whereas 55.2% of statements 
featured industry arguments.  
 
Interpretation 
WTO discussions on alcohol health-warnings advance arguments used by the alcohol industry in 
domestic settings to undermine effective alcohol policy. WTO members appear to be influenced 
by alcohol industry interests, despite a minority of challenges explicitly referencing industry 











Research in Context 
 
Evidence before this study 
Alcohol policies are necessary to reduce alcohol-related harms and to achieve multiple global 
health targets. To achieve these goals, barriers to effective implementation must be identified and 
overcome. It has been suggested that the alcohol industry opposes effective policies using tactics 
akin to those deployed by the tobacco and food industries. Some evidence has emerged, but 
research on alcohol industry practices remains nascent, especially in comparison to research on 
tobacco and food industry practices. A key potential forum for influence is the World Trade 
Organization’s (WTO) Committee on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT). To date, there has 
been no empirical study examining whether trade fora, including the WTO, are forums for 
alcohol industry influence through the airing of industry arguments against alcohol policies 
designed to address alcohol-related harms. 
  
Added value of this study 
We examined the alcohol industry’s potential influence on alcohol policy debates at the WTO 
TBT Committee. We focus specifically on discussions on novel alcohol health warning labelling 
policies. WTO members made 212 statements about these policy proposals during 57 
discussions, 2010-2019. WTO members stated that their claims represented industry in 7 (3.3%) 
statements .We further found that industry arguments, commonly used to oppose effective 
alcohol control policies in domestic settings, featured in 117 (55.2%) WTO member statements. 
For example, WTO members claimed that the policies were unnecessary, costly, and an 
administrative burden for industry, and that alternative, less-costly policies should be adopted. 
Members questioned the evidence used to develop the policies, and claimed that the measures 
were scientifically inaccurate. These claims were raised alongside statements that framed alcohol-
related harms as arising from ‘excessive’ or ‘problem’ drinking, whereas ‘moderate’ or 
‘responsible’ drinking was deemed unharmful and even healthy.  
 
Implications of all the available evidence 
These findings indicate that WTO discussions are a forum for alcohol industry influence over 
alcohol policy. Several actions may be necessary in order to accelerate progress towards 
reductions in alcohol-related harms. First, there is a need for greater transparency and 
acknowledgement of industry input to the positions advanced by WTO members; and for public 
health and WHO to be given timely opportunities to speak to government officials about the 
positions taken by government in the WTO. Second, health and trade policy officials should be 




Alcohol consumption is a significant and growing contributor to ill-health and premature 
mortality worldwide. The World Health Organization’s (WHO) Global Status Report on Alcohol and 
Health 2018 estimated that alcohol is responsible for more than 25% of global deaths in people 
aged 20–39 years and kills over 3 million people annually(1). National governments have made 
commitments to reduce alcohol-related harms, including through the WHO Global Strategy to 
Reduce the Harmful Use of Alcohol 2010 and the 2030 Sustainable Development Goals (SDG). 
Further progress is being made through the development of the WHO Global Alcohol Action 
Plan(2). Alcohol control policies at the national level are necessary to realise these goals and, in 
order to accelerate progress, barriers to effective intervention must be identified and 
overcome(3). 
 
It has been suggested that the alcohol industry, including producers, importers, wholesalers, 
marketers, retailers, and trade associations, plays a major role in stalling effective policy 
development and implementation using tactics akin to the tobacco and food industries(4,5). 
These tactics include lobbying against effective interventions, arguing that they are unnecessary 
or too costly, promoting industry as a partner in harm reduction, and stating that information 
campaigns are more appropriate and effective than population-level interventions such as 
taxation and marketing restrictions(6,7). To justify these policy positions, industry seeks to shape 
political, scientific, and public discussions in ways that legitimise policies that serve its interests 
and de-legitimise those it contests. This is achieved by casting doubt about the harms of alcohol 
use and the efficacy of different interventions, citing the benefits of ‘moderate’ consumption, 
challenging the legality of measures, and focussing on harms to specific sub-populations only, 
such as youth or drink drivers. These ‘discursive strategies’ are apparent in industry-funded 
research, policy reports, and consultation submissions, and constitute an important tool of 
industry influence and power(8).  
 
Yet, empirical research on the alcohol industry’s influence at the global level remains sparse (see 
‘Research in Context’ panel) (9–11). Most research instead focusses on the exertion of influence 
within nation states, primarily in high-income countries(6,12). However, in the current era of 
globalization, corporations have a strong incentive to extend their influence at the global level. 
They have expanded their profit base to new foreign jurisdictions as growth in existing domestic 
markets stagnates(13). For example, in 2019 Anheuser-Busch InBev SA/NV, the world’s largest 
alcohol beverage company, sold its products in >150 countries, and derived over 60% of its 
revenue from ‘emerging markets’ including Argentina, Colombia, Ecuador and South Africa(14). 
 
One possible tool of industry influence at the global level is the use of international trade 
agreements to oppose domestic health policies(15). These agreements are designed to promote 
trade and investment, and contain rules designed to reduce the cost of transactions and create a 
fair, predictable trading environment(16). Trade rules operate as political and legal determinants 
of health and can impact health in many different ways, for example by increasing consumption 
of health-damaging commodities, or by reducing poverty-related illnesses, such as child 
mortality, provided economic gains from trade are widespread(17–20). Importantly, trade 
agreements can serve industry interests when the agreements are used to delay policy progress in 
a manner which benefits industry or when a state challenges another state’s health policies on the 
basis of the rules in the trade agreement(21). This has previously occurred at the tobacco and 
food industry’s request(22–24). States may delay, modify, or abandon policies in response to 





World Trade Organization (WTO) agreements have been influential in domestic health policy, 
particularly the Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) which prohibits ‘unnecessary 
obstacles to international trade’ created by domestic technical regulations and standards(26). The 
Agreement further prohibits ‘discrimination’ where, for example, WTO members apply more 
stringent rules on products imported from one country over another, or on imported products 
as compared with those produced domestically.  
 
Previous research indicates that tobacco, food and pharmaceutical industries have lobbied 
national governments to contest health policies at WTO’s TBT Committee(22–24).  
Statements made at the Committee typically feature requests for information and queries about a 
policy’s consistency with TBT rules(24). Although these statements and the specific claims raised 
to explain why a policy is inconsistent with the rules may be raised at industries’ request, there is 
no obligation to disclose their genesis. Committee discussions take place tri-annually among 
WTO member representatives (164 countries and the EU) in Geneva, Switzerland and have a 
diplomatic tone(26). The Committee is a subsidiary body of the WTO’s Council for Trade in 
Goods. In general, only WTO members participate in TBT Committee meetings, although inter-
governmental organizations (such as WHO) are sometimes present. The WHO has observer 
status at the Committee through the WHO and Food and Agriculture Organization’s joint 
Codex Alimentarius Commission.  
 
Multiple policies are discussed at each TBT Committee meeting, and policies are often discussed 
at multiple meetings. The re-occurrence of discussions on a member’s proposal suggests a level 
of concern and contentiousness surrounding the policy(27). Concerns which cannot be resolved 
in the Committee may be escalated to formal dispute settlement within the WTO, but a majority 
of issues is addressed – and policies are often changed – without such escalation(22). Thus, the 
Committee is an important forum of influence on states’ domestic policies.  
 
In this article, we investigate whether the TBT Committee has served as a forum for airing 
industry arguments against policies designed to address alcohol-related harms. We focus 
specifically on proposals for alcohol health-warning labelling policies which target the “provision 
of consumer information about, and labelling of, alcoholic beverages to indicate the harm related 
to alcohol”(28). These policies are recommended by WHO, fall within the remit of TBT rules, 
and have been increasingly frequently challenged at the TBT Committee(29). We examine 
whether, and which, alcohol industry arguments advanced in domestic forums are reproduced in 
the arguments made by national government representatives in the TBT Committee and the 
extent to which these arguments are expressly attributed to the alcohol industry. 
 
Data & Methods 
We searched the written minutes of all TBT Committee meetings for discussions on alcohol 
health-warning labelling policies since 1995, when the first TBT Committee meeting occurred, to 
December 2019, when we collected data. Table 1 lists the policies we identified and the 
documents we analysed. The first policy was discussed in 2010, and the final discussion occurred 
in December 2019. Our data comprise n=83 documents, including notifications to the WTO of 
the policy proposal, TBT Committee minutes, and written comments by WTO members. These 
documents pertain to discussions on 10 health warning labelling policies proposed by Thailand 
(2010), Kenya (2011), the Dominican Republic (2012), Israel (2012), Turkey (2013), Mexico 
(2014), India (2016), South Africa (2016), Ireland (2016), and the Republic of Korea (2016) (see 
Figure 1). Across the 83 documents, there were 212 WTO member statements about the 10 
policies. Appendix p.1 provides more detail on how we searched the minutes and Appendix p.2-




To code the data, we first identified all instances where WTO members stated explicitly that 
their statements reflected comments raised by industry. Such statements are clear evidence of 
industry influence on the WTO member’s stance (i.e. opposing or supporting) and specific 
comments at the Committee. We also developed a novel taxonomy of industry arguments made 
in domestic policy forums, and then identified all instances where the arguments raised by WTO 
members at the TBT Committee matched the taxonomy, even if the comment was not attributed 
to industry. These matches identify additional possible instances of industry influence that may 
not be disclosed. Note that WTO members have considerable discretion as to how they 
elaborate on this argument, and at this point in particular there is scope for industry arguments 
to be aired. 
 
Appendix p.6-9 provides further detail on how we identified industry arguments and the full 
taxonomy used to code the data. Briefly, we combined a systematic review of alcohol industry 
involvement in policy-making by McCambridge et al. with additional literature to create a list of 
industry arguments against effective interventions(6). We grouped industry arguments into two 
over-arching categories: i) policy positions: alcohol industry arguments regarding policies, and 
how they should be developed and enforced; ii) discursive strategies: how the policy issue, its 
causes, and consequences were described, and other statements concerning the appropriateness 
of the policy and/or need for reform. We then created sub-categories within these. In all cases, 
we further examined how these industry arguments are used to raise concerns about whether a 
policy measure is consistent with Art 2.2 of the TBT Agreement, which requires members to 
ensure their regulations do not create “unnecessary obstacles to international trade”(26). 
 
Two authors (PB & DG) independently coded a sample of documents. The authors compared 
their coding and discussed inconsistencies. One author (PB) then re-coded the sample and a 
second author (DG) verified the re-coded sample. Finally, one author (PB) coded all documents. 
We grouped coded statements into common underlying themes, and cross-tabulated these to 
identify the most common arguments. Coding was performed in NVivo 12. Summary figures 
were created using RStudio v1.3. 
 
Results 
Figures 1 and 2 summarise TBT Committee discussions on the 10 alcohol health warning 
labelling policies. Most policies (7/10) were discussed during more than one meeting, and the 
median number of meetings at which each policy was discussed was 4 (min=1, max=12) (see 
Figure 2). Discussions intensified between 2016-2019 (see Figure 2). There were 57 discussions 
about the 10 policies, within which WTO members made a total of 212 statements. Statements 
were made by several large, high-income members, most commonly the EU (n=37 statements), 
USA (n=34) and New Zealand (n=20), as well as some LMICs, including Mexico (n=28), Chile 
(n=15), and Argentina (n=13) (see Figure 1). 
 
 [Figures 1 and 2 about here] 
 
We identified 7 statements (3.3%) in which members stated that their comments reflected 
concerns raised by industry. The US, Canada, Korea, and Mexico all made such statements. For 
example, when commenting on Thailand’s measure, a US representative stated that “The US 
industry had informed the United States trade representative that the requirement…would be 
extremely difficult for suppliers to manage and very disruptive to the production process” 
(G/TBT/M/51). A Mexican representative also “expressed concern raised by domestic industry 





Furthermore, we identified 117 WTO member statements (55%) which featured industry policy 
positions and discursive strategies taken in other policy forums and included in the taxonomy 
(Appendix p.10-15 shows a full list). Figure 3 shows how such arguments were used in relation 
to the criteria for analysing whether a policy measure is consistent with Art 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement. The remaining statements did not contain comments similar to the policy positions 
and discursive strategies used by the alcohol industry in domestic forums, and were raised by 
diverse country officials (WTO member representatives). 
 
 [Figure 3 about here] 
 
 
Questioning the evidence 
Firstly, arguments aired by the alcohol industry in domestic policy settings are echoed in the 
practice of WTO members questioning the evidence behind the policy decisions and promoting 
the ideal of ‘science-based’ policy. Such arguments are commonly used at the WTO to discuss 
whether and how a measure contributes to achieving a member’s objective, which often turns on 
the quality of the evidence. The specific arguments used when making this claim featured 
common refrains from industry. In relation to warnings, we found calls for access to the 
evidence that was used in developing the warning statements (e.g. US to India, G/TBT/M/79) 
or the evidence for the decision to implement the policy (Mexico to Kenya, G/TBT/M/54), 
implicitly questioning the evidence base. Members further made general statements calling on 
others to ensure policies “would reflect scientific consensus” on the harms from alcohol 
consumption (Australia to Korea, G/TBT/M/70). Elsewhere, members explicitly questioned the 
scientific basis of the warning messages, for example stating that there was “no scientific 
evidence” to support the claim that “alcohol is carcinogenic” (Mexico to Korea, G/TBT/M/70).  
 
Identifying and emphasising detrimental trade and business costs 
Secondly, we identified multiple instances where WTO members’ arguments resembled 
industry’s common position in domestic contexts that the interventions are an undue impost on 
business. Whilst the trade impacts of a measure are part of assessing Art 2.2 of the TBT 
Agreement, members used specific claims that industry raises elsewhere to elaborate on these 
costs. They stressed the negative impacts of the policies for businesses due, for example, to “the 
cost involved in developing bespoke labels” (Australia to Ireland, G/TBT/M/75).  
 
Promoting alternative policies  
Thirdly, the tactic of proposing alternative policies, including those that do not directly regulate 
alcohol products, is common to the alcohol industry in domestic policy forums. It is also 
common at WTO. It is part of the test for whether a measure is inconsistent with Art 2.2. To 
expand on this, WTO members stated that “other, less trade-restrictive approaches” could be 
pursued (US to Korea, G/TBT/M/78), or that the objectives could even “be better achieved” 
though alternative strategies (EU to Turkey, G/TBT/M/61). The measures proposed as 
alternatives in the TBT Committee are also consistent with those industry proposes elsewhere. 
WTO members called for targeted “initiatives to reduce drinking and driving” (US to Korea, 
G/TBT/M/78). WTO members also promoted information and awareness campaigns, as when 
the EU urged Kenya “to reconsider” its proposed measure as “[e]ducation and information 
activities seemed to be appropriate means to address the public health objective pursued” (EU to 
Kenya, G/TBT/M/54). Mexico similarly stated that Ireland could use “campaigns to raise 
awareness of the harmful effects on health caused by the excessive consumption of alcohol” 





Reframing the problem 
When discussing alternative policies, WTO members made arguments which industry uses in 
domestic debates to de-scale or minimise the issue and (re-)frame alcohol-related problems. One 
common argument in the TBT Committee concerned the harms from different levels of alcohol 
consumption, whereupon ‘moderate’ or ‘responsible’ drinking was deemed unharmful and even 
healthy, whereas excessive drinking or ‘problem drinkers’ were the primary problem. For 
example, these frames featured in the EU statement that “it was excessive consumption – not 
any consumption – that posed a risk to consumer health” (EU to Turkey, 2014, G/TBT/M/61), 
and a complaint that a label required generic messages “without distinguishing between abusive 
and harmful consumption on the one hand and responsible consumption on the other” 
(Argentina to Ireland, G/TBT/M/74).  
 
Similarly, WTO members focussed on a narrow set of conditions in which harms arise. This 
occurred where they noted the “risks posed by alcohol consumption to those underage, 
pregnant, or driving” (Canada to Turkey, G/TBT/M/61), rather than the general population. It 
also occurred when discussions focused on harms arising from “driving under the influence of 
alcohol” (US to Korea, G/TBT/M/79), rather than in other contexts. WTO members further 
minimised the issue by emphasising beneficial effects. For example, a Mexican representative 
stated that scientific literature “stressed that moderate consumption of alcohol was also regarded 
as an important part of a healthy lifestyle” (Mexico to Korea, G/TBT/M/70). 
 
Promoting industry partnerships 
Finally, WTO members promoted the idea that instead of adopting the proposed measure, 
industry should be a partner in alcohol harm reduction and help government to identify 
alternatives, as industry often proposes in domestic settings. The US, for example, stated that it 
“supported several public-private partnership initiatives related to combating the harmful use of 
alcohol” (US to Korea, G/TBT/M/87). Mexico also requested Korea to hold “a video 
conference with the Korean authorities responsible for the measure, in order to clarify the nature 
of the scientific and technical information considered in connection with its implementation and 




Our analysis found that discussions on 10 alcohol health-warning labelling policies at the WTO 
TBT Committee, 2010-2019, featured arguments that are regularly advanced by industry to 
undermine effective alcohol policy implementation in domestic settings. However, members 
stated that their claims represented industry in just 7 (3.3%) statements, whereas we found that 
117 (55.2%) statements were similar to the policy positions and discursive strategies used by the 
alcohol industry in domestic policy forums.  
 
Specifically, we identified instances where WTO members claimed that the policies were 
unnecessary, costly, and an administrative burden for industry, and that alternative, less-costly 
policies should be adopted. Members questioned the evidence used to develop the policies, 
promoted the ideal of evidence-based policy, and claimed that the measures were scientifically 
inaccurate. These claims were raised alongside statements that de-scaled or minimised the 
problem and framed alcohol-related harms as arising from ‘excessive’ or ‘problem’ drinking, or 
in a specific set of conditions (such as drink driving or during pregnancy), whereas ‘moderate’ or 
‘responsible’ drinking was deemed unharmful and even healthy. Members subsequently advanced 
alternative, narrowly-targeted strategies for alcohol harm reduction such as information and 
awareness campaigns (as opposed to the population-wide labelling approach being proposed), 
and promoted industry as a partner in the development of these policies. These arguments are all 
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similar to those repeatedly deployed by industry to counter effective policies and disseminate 
doubt about the harms from alcohol consumption and the efficacy of proposed interventions in 
domestic settings(5–7).  
 
While member positions at the WTO are influenced by a range of matters other than industry 
interventions, our analysis provides evidence that these TBT Committee discussions serve 
industry interests and may also be directly or indirectly influenced by the alcohol industry, 
through three avenues. First, the influence of industry might be direct where the member 
receives a submission from, or engages in discussion with, domestic industry about its position 
and the member repeats the industry position in the Committee, as identified in 7 statements. 
Second, influence might be indirect, with no discussions between the WTO member and 
industry about the specific measure. However, the industry’s arguments made in domestic policy 
settings on other occasions may feature because alcohol advertising, paid newspaper articles, paid 
research and publicity on the health benefits of alcohol may influence the government’s stance 
on the issue.  
 
Third, WTO members may question alcohol-labelling policies as a result of a pro-liberalization 
ideology and a desire to promote national economic interests, which often coincide with alcohol 
industry interests(24,30). Furthermore, the TBT Agreement acknowledges the protection of 
public health as a legitimate policy objective. Yet the focus of discussions at the Committee is on 
raising concerns about proposed measures and their potential inconsistencies with the 
Agreement – an environment which may encourage the prioritisation of trade over health 
interests. 
 
These findings suggest that the WTO discussions are influenced to some extent by the alcohol 
industry, and potentially give the alcohol industry a means of influence over the domestic alcohol 
policies of other countries. This influence via the WTO may delay or undermine policy. The 
echoing of industry arguments at the TBT Committee by WTO members may also reinforce the 
perceived validity of arguments raised by industry in domestic settings, further strengthening 
industry influence.  
 
A limitation of the research presented in this paper is that it did not examine the responses and 
rebuttals to arguments and questions raised about alcohol labelling policies, or the discursive 
interaction between participants. This type of analysis may offer clues about the types of 
counterarguments and strategies that might mitigate industry pressures – an important area for 
future research. 
 
As with other health harming industries, our findings raise concerns about the influence (direct 
or indirect) that vested commercial interests can exert at the WTO and suggest this needs to be 
addressed to accelerate global alcohol policy implementation. Occasionally, connections between 
WTO members’ positions and industry concerns were made explicit in members’ statements. 
Overwhelmingly, however, there was no explicit connection, and it was only through the 
methods used in this study that the apparent airing of industry arguments could be identified.  
 
These findings have important implications for policymakers seeking to address the growing 
global burden of illness and mortality wrought by alcohol consumption and the related targets 
within the WHO Global Alcohol Strategy and SDGs. Curbing direct or indirect industry 
influence on the positions and arguments raised by WTO members at the TBT Committee 
appears necessary to accelerate progress towards these targets. At minimum, it is necessary to 
ensure there is greater transparency about if, and when, vested interests are being represented at 
the WTO, with greater acknowledgement of industry input. Our findings also suggest a need for 
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public health and other interests to be given timely opportunities to comment on WTO member 
positions, and for WTO members to justify the positions taken at the WTO TBT Committee to 
domestic stakeholders. Greater involvement of WHO in alcohol policy discussions at the TBT 
Committee would also assist in counterbalancing industry influence, as was the case with the 
TBT Committee discussions about plain packaging of tobacco(31). 
 
It will also be important for both trade and health policy officials to ensure they have access to 
the resources and knowledge necessary to identify and mitigate industry pressures in this forum. 
Health departments may not be consulted by the trade department in the formulation of the 
country’s position on another WTO members’ proposed alcohol policy measures. This 
disjuncture between government departments is important to remediate. The UN and WHO 
also have an important role to play in fostering dialogue between trade and health sectors.  
 
Finally, public health researchers and trade policy analysts must continue to ensure that new 
trade liberalization rules do not create negative health, social, or environmental externalities, 
including rules in draft plurilateral agreements scheduled for discussion at the November 2021 
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Table 1. WTO documents included in analysis 
Member and policy WTO documentation reference 
Thailand - Criteria, Procedures and 
Requirements for Alcohol Beverage Packages 
or Pictorial Labels/Warning Statements  
G/TBT/N/THA/332, 
G/TBT/N/THA/332/Add.1, G/TBT/M/50, 
G/TBT/M/51, G/TBT/M/52, G/TBT/M/53, 
G/TBT/M/54, G/TBT/M/55, G/TBT/M/56, 
G/TBT/W/408, G/TBT/W/431 




G/TBT/M/55, G/TBT/M/56, G/TBT/M/57, 
G/TBT/M/61, G/TBT/M/62 
Dominican Republic - Categorization of 




Israel - Restriction on advertising and 
marketing of alcoholic beverages   
G/TBT/N/ISR/609, G/TBT/M/58, 
G/TBT/M/59, G/TBT/M/60, G/TBT/M/61 
Turkey – Draft Communiqué on Warning 
Messages Placed on Containers of Principles 
Concerning Domestic and Foreign Trading of 






Mexico - Draft Mexican Official Standard: 
Alcoholic beverages health specifications 
G/TBT/N/MEX/254, G/TBT/M/64 
India - Draft Food Safety and Standards 
Regulations 
G/TBT/N/IND/51, G/TBT/M/68, 
G/TBT/M/69, G/TBT/M/70, G/TBT/M/71, 
G/TBT/M/72, G/TBT/M/73, G/TBT/M/74, 
G/TBT/M/75, G/TBT/M/76, G/TBT/M/77, 
G/TBT/M/78, G/TBT/M/79, G/TBT/W/495 
South Africa - Amendment to Regulations 
Relating to Health Messages on Container 
Labels of Alcoholic Beverages 
G/TBT/N/ZAF/48/Rev.1, G/TBT/M/68 
Ireland - Public Health (Alcohol) Bill 2015 G/TBT/N/IRL/2, G/TBT/M/70, 
G/TBT/M/71, G/TBT/M/72, G/TBT/M/73, 
G/TBT/M/74, G/TBT/M/75, G/TBT/M/76, 
G/TBT/M/77, G/TBT/M/78, G/TBT/M/79, 
G/TBT/W/495 
Korea, Republic of - Amendment of the 
Notifications on Warning Messages on 
Smoking and Drinking 
G/TBT/N/KOR/664, G/TBT/M/70, 
G/TBT/M/71, G/TBT/M/72, G/TBT/M/73, 
G/TBT/M/74, G/TBT/M/78, G/TBT/M/79, 
G/TBT/W/504 
Notes: Document references refer to WTO Document IDs. All documents are publicly available 
and can be downloaded from the WTO Documents Online archive.(30) If multiple policies were 
mentioned in a single WTO Document, each mention was treated as a different document for 







Figure 1. WTO members raising/subject to discussions on health warning labelling proposals at the TBT 
Committee, 2010-2019 
 
Notes: Mexico and South Africa proposed health warning labels and also raised comments and 
concerns at the TBT Committee, hence there are arrows both to and from these countries. See 
Appendix p.16 for further detail.  
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Figure 2. Timing and number of discussions on alcohol health warning labelling proposals at the TBT Committee meetings, 2010-2019 
 
 
Notes: Some policies (e.g. India and Korea’s policies) were not discussed at all TBT Committee meetings between dates shown, hence the number of 





Figure 3. Relationship between WTO members’ industry-aligned arguments and criteria used to assess conformity to the TBT Agreement 
 
Notes: Figure shows how arguments raised by industry in domestic settings are also raised by WTO members and their relationship to criteria used to 
analyse whether a policy measure is consistent with art 2.2 of the TBT Agreement. Specifically, the art 2.2 analysis covers: (1) the contribution of a measure to 
the achievements of a state’s legitimate objectives; (2) the impacts of trade on the measure; and (3) the availability of an alternative measure which would make 
an equal contribution to the achievement of the party’s objectives, taking into account the risks non-fulfilment of the objectives would create, but which is less 
trade restrictive than the proposed measure. 
  
Industry arguments raised in domestic settings and by WTO members Criteria for assessing conforming to TBT Agreement, Art 2.2
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Appendix 1. Policy and documentation identification procedure   
 
Our data includes the minutes from all TBT Committee meetings in which alcohol health 
warning labelling policies were discussed since 1995. In practice, our data span the period from 
2010 to 2019. This time period spans the date when an alcohol health warning labelling measure 
was first discussed at the TBT Committee (March 2010 TBT meeting) to the date of the meeting 
for which minutes were most recently available at the time of data collection (November 2019 
TBT meeting; data collection occurred in December 2019).  
 
To obtain a list of relevant policies discussed at WTO and corresponding documentation we 
combined data from multiple sources.1–3 We first searched a dataset compiled by Barlow et al. to 
identify all alcohol policies that were discussed at the TBT Committee, 1995-2016.1 We then 
repeated procedures described in Barlow et al. to identify additional alcohol polices discussed 
since 2016. Briefly, this involved first identifying all challenges to health policies at the TBT 
Committee, 2016-2019, by searching for all health policies challenged at the TBT Committee in 
the TBT Information Management System. This online database lists all TBT challenges 
according to the policy issue targeted, including health.3 We then manually reviewed the list of 
challenges to health policies, 2016-2019, to identify those centred on alcohol policy, by searching 
the term ‘alcohol’ in the list.   
 
After identifying this start list of TBT challenges to alcohol policies (n=38), 1995-2019, we 
obtained minutes from the meetings where these policies were discussed from WTO Documents 
Online.2 We reviewed the relevant sections of the minutes detailing discussions about the 
policies and additional policy documentation referenced therein in order to identify discussions 
centred specifically on health warning labelling policies (see Appendix 2). To ensure the 
completeness of this list we further conducted backward searches of the term ‘alcohol’ in all 
TBT Committee minutes, 1995-2020, to ensure we had identified all relevant policies discussed 
at these meetings.  
 
Using these procedures we identified TBT discussions on 10 health warning labelling regulation 




Appendix 2. Alcohol health warning labelling policies discussed at the TBT Committee, 2010-2019 
This information was compiled using the original WTO notifications and government 
documents referenced in these notifications and subsequent TBT Committee discussions. Where 
WTO notifications and government documents provided insufficient detail, additional 
information was sourced via Google Searches and reviews of US GAIN reports. The latter 
contain detailed summaries of policies affecting trade among US trade partners, including 
proposed or implemented alcohol labelling regulations. The specific sources of information used 




Pictorial labels shall be provided with the warning statements on the harm of alcohol wherein 
the picture shall be printed in 4 colors and 6 types of which one of them is required to be rotated 
at 1,000 package intervals.  
 
The following 6 types of pictorial labels/ warning statements shall be labelled in accordance with 
the templates as appeared in the annex 
 
Type 1. "Drinking alcohol causes the hypertension liver cirrhosis"  
Type 2. "Alcohol intoxication leads to the accidents.  
Type 3. "Drinking alcohol leads to unconsciousness and even death" 
Type 4. "Drinking alcohol leads to inferior sexual performance"  
Type 5. "Drinking alcohol leads to adverse health effect and family problems"   
Type 6."Drinking alcohol is a bad influence on children and young people"  
 
The publication of pictorial labels/ warning statements above is specified as follows:  
- If the package is in rectangular shape, the space shall not be less than 50 percents of the 
space of each side with the maximum space or the front and the back side of the 
package, or not less than 30 percent of the total area of the packages if the package is in 
round or cylinder shape.  
-  If the package is of the other shape than as specified above, the warning statements 




The following health messages shall be displayed on every package containing an alcoholic drink, 
sign or advertisement stipulated under the provisions of this Act: 
 
(a) Excessive alcohol consumption is harmful to your health;  
(b) Excessive alcohol consumption can cause liver cirrhosis;  
(c) Excessive alcohol consumption impairs your judgment; do not drive or operate machinery;  
(d) Not for sale to persons under the age of 18 years.  
Every package containing an alcoholic drink shall—  
(a) bear a statement as to its constituents; and  
(b) have at least two of the health warning messages prescribed in the Second Schedule, in 
English or Kiswahili.  
 
There are additional requirements, as follows: 
- The statement and health warning referred to in subsection (2) shall comprise not less 
than 30% of the total surface area of the package.  
- All the warning labels specified in the Second Schedule shall be randomly displayed in 
each twelve-month period on a rotational basis and in as equal a number of times as is 
possible, on every successive fifty packages of each brand of the alcoholic drink and shall 
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be randomly distributed in all areas within the Republic of Kenya in which the alcoholic 
drink is marketed.  
- The Minister may, by notice in the Gazette, prescribe that the warning, required under 
this section, be in the form of pictures or pictograms: Provided that such notice shall 
come into operation upon expiration of six months from the date of its publication.  
 
Dominican Republic 
For alcoholic beverages, an additional disclaimer must be included with the following warning: 
“El consumo de alcohol perjudica la salud” (the consumption of alcohol damages the user’s 
health), according to General Health Law No. 42-01. 
 
Israel 
On 30 January 2012, the Knesset (Israel Parliament) approved the Restriction on advertising and 
marketing of alcoholic beverages Law 5772-2012, initiated by the Ministry of Health.  
 
The law included the requirement to add  a warning label to the front of each container of 
intoxicating beverage. The wording of the warning on, or on the label of, the intoxicating liquor 
container will be as set out below: 
 
 (1) with respect to strong intoxicating liquor - “Warning - excessive alcohol consumption risks 
life and is harmful to health!”  
(2) with respect to intoxicating liquor - “Warning - contains alcohol - excessive drinking should 
be avoided.” 
 
There are additional requirements, as follows: 
- The wording of the warning mentioned in sub-regulation (a) will be affixed or printed on 
the intoxicating liquor container itself or on its label as stated in section 8 of the Law, in 
a legible manner.  
- The wording of the warning mentioned in sub-regulation (a), as appropriate, will be 
prominently marked, in black lettering that is legible and identically emphasized, on a 
white background, having a size equal to 15% of the size of the label but not smaller 
than 10% of the surface of the container and will be surrounded by a black frame as 
thick as and emphasized in the same way as the lettering of the warning.  
 
Turkey 
The following three graphical warning messages and one text warning message shall be used all 
together in the inner and outer packaging excepting the bottom of alcoholic beverages 
authorised for placing on the market:  
 
 
(4) Alcohol is not your friend. 
 
There are additional requirements, as follows: 
01/09/2021 
 p.21 
- Alcoholic beverages not carrying warning messages may not be placed on or sold in the 
internal market.  
- Warning messages may not in any manner be hidden, covered up or cut off. Banderoles, 
stamps or similar additions may not be written on them.  
- Warnings must be printed as fixed and indelible.  
- The text shall be in regular statement format with numerals bold, other parts in lower 




Labels of alcohol beverages of 2.0% to 55%ABV must include "The abuse of the consumption 
of this product is harmful to health."  
 
The warning must be in uppercase and in a contrasting color. The required size of lettering 




There are additional requirements, as follows: 
- For labels of alcohol beverages of higher than 6.0%ABV: of three pictogram warnings 
(against consumption by minors aged under 18 and by pregnant women and against 
driving under the influence of alcohol), either all three must be included 
simultaneously, or a single one may be included in which case the pictogram chosen 
must be changed on a rotating principle every four months.  
- Labels of alcohol beverages with of 2.0-6.0%ABV must display a modified pictogram 
warning against consumption by minors aged under 18.  
- Labels of alcohol beverages of below 2.0% ABV must include “This product contains % 
of alcohol. Not recommended for children.” 
- Labels may voluntarily include the statement "For more information visit the page: 
www.conadic.salud.gob.mx, where there is information on the harmful use of alcohol". 
 
South Africa 
The regulation prescribes the labelling of alcoholic beverages with health warnings. The purpose 
is to warn individuals and the community about the harm caused by alcohol abuse. 
 
Container labels for alcohol beverages must contain at least one of the [seven] health messages, 
which must be in black on a white background, visible, legible, and indelible and must be at least 
one eight of the total size of the container label: 
“Alcohol abuse is dangerous to your health”  
“Alcohol is addictive”  
“Alcohol increases your risk to personal injuries”  
“Alcohol is a major cause of violence and crime”  
“Drinking during pregnancy can be harmful to your unborn baby”  
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“Don’t drink and walk on the road, you may be killed”  
“Alcohol reduces driving ability, don’t drink and drive” 
 
India 
Chapter 6 of the draft regulation states that in addition to the applicable general labelling related 
regulations laid down under the Food Safety and Standards (Packaging and Labelling) 
Regulations, 2011, every package containing alcoholic beverages shall include a a Statutory 
Warning ‘Consumption of Alcohol is injurious to health’, printed in English language at the 
manufacturer’s end. In case respective states wish the same to be also printed in their local/ 
regional languages, the same shall be allowed through an additional Sticker, without the need for 




The requirement for labelling was included in the Public Health Alcohol Bill. In 2018, another 
act was passed giving the Minister of Health the power to prescribe the form of these warnings  
 
Section 11 outlines provisions to provide information to consumers on alcohol products, i.e. 
health and pregnancy warnings, quantity of grams, energy value and details of an alcohol public 
health website to be established by the HSE.  
 
Subsection (1) provides that it will be an offence to: manufacture or import for sale in Ireland; or 
to sell to a person in Ireland an alcohol product whose bottle, container or any additional 
packaging does not contain:  
(i) prescribed warning informing the public of the danger of alcohol consumption;  
(ii) a prescribed warning informing the public of the danger of alcohol consumption 
when pregnant;  
(iii) the quantity in grams of alcohol in the alcohol product concerned,  
(iv) the energy value of the alcohol product and 
(v) the details of website (to be established by the HSE) providing public health 
information in relation to alcohol.  
 
 
Korea, Republic of 
The regulation modifies the labelling requirements of alcoholic beverage products sold in the 
Republic of Korea, so that warning messages about drinking during pregnancy, especially about 
the possible negative effects on foetus, are included in the label. Labels of beverages of 1%ABV 
or higher must include one of three warnings:  
(i) Drinking during pregnancy increases the risk for congenital anomaly. Alcohol is [a] 
carcinogen, so excessive drinking causes liver cancer, gastric adenocarcinoma and so 
on 
(ii) Drinking during pregnancy, underage drinking, and excessive drinking cause 
congenital anomaly, brain development disruptions and cancer, respectively.  
(iii) Drinking during pregnancy increase[s] the risk for congenital anomaly, Excessive 






Appendix 3. Taxonomy development procedures 
 
Our taxonomy was developed using a recently published review of the industry’s involvement in 
policy-making by McCambridge et al. 4 We used this review to develop a preliminary list of 
industry strategies, including arguments to contest effective alcohol policy. We subsequently 
expanded on this list through additional targeted searches and sources referenced in the 
McCambridge et. al paper. We conducted these additional searches as the principal focus of our 
analysis concerned argumentation patterns and strategies whereas the McCambridge et al. study 
concerned a broader range of tactics, which necessitated the aggregation of some argumentation 
strategies. Furthermore, it was possible that studies published since the date of the McCambridge 
review identified additional strategies. To bring greater specificity to our taxonomy we therefore 
conducted additional targeted searches of previous reviews and empirical studies of industry 
influence to ensure the taxonomy captured a comprehensive and up-to-date range of industry 
argumentation tactics.  
 
We identified these additional papers by reviewing the bibliography of McCambridge et al. to 
identify previous summaries of industry strategies. 5–11 From these earlier studies we extracted 
summaries of the industry argumentation strategies they identified, and added these to our list of 
alcohol industry political strategies. We also searched Google Scholar and PubMed for recent 
papers which made references to the papers in the bibliography of McCambridge et al. and the 
review by McCambridge et al. itself.5–11 We then identified industry strategies within these more 
recent papers, and again added these to our list of alcohol industry political strategies. We 
subsequently grouped all arguments into those which concern specific arguments regarding 
alcohol consumption or policy, and other ‘instrumental’ techniques which do not necessarily 
feature in written or oral arguments such as funding politicians or scientific research.  
 
We then excluded instrumental techniques and grouped the list of argumentation strategies into 
common underlying categories and sub-categories using methods for narrative synthesis.12 This 
involves providing structured summaries of the themes in the data and then organising the data 
into categories of similar themes. We therefore adopted this method as it is suitable for 
identifying commonalities within qualitative data. 
 
To this end, first disaggregated argumentation strategies into two broad categories: i) policy 
positions, that is, alcohol industry arguments regarding what policies should be adopted, how 
they should be developed, and enforcement mechanisms; and ii) discursive strategies, that is, 
frames (i.e. how the policy issue,  its cause, and its costs and consequences are described and 
what is emphasised in this description) and other normative statements concerning the 
appropriateness of the policy and/or need for reform that are used to advance or bolster a 
particular argument.  We then created additional second- and third-order sub-categories within 
these broader level themes to capture different policy positions and discursive strategies.  
 






Appendix 4. Taxonomy of industry arguments against effective alcohol policies 
Argumentation 
category 
Theme Description and sub-themes 
Policy positions Promote targeted 
strategies 
Promote targeted approaches to alcohol harm reduction 
among particular sub-populations, e.g. excessive drinkers 
or those with addictions 
Oppose whole of 
population approach 
as a basis to argue for 
alternative strategies 
Oppose the whole population approach. For example, 
oppose::  
1) Minimum unit pricing (UK) (ineffective, illegal and 
counterproductive; unfairly targets moderate and less 
wealthy drinkers) 
2) Tax increases (except as a ‘less bad’ alternative to 
MUP) 
3) Advertising, marketing and sponsorship restrictions 
4) Reductions in blood alcohol levels in drink-driving 
laws 




Promote voluntary, co- and self-regulatory initiatives and 
partnerships (as direct alternatives to mandatory 
regimes), including making commitments to reduce 
underage alcohol use, strengthen self-regulatory 
marketing codes, prevent driving under the influence of 
alcohol, act responsibly in the area of product 
innovation, encourage retailers to reduce harmful 





Promote the alcohol industry as a key partner in the 
policy formulation and implementation process and in 





Promote better enforcement of existing laws like 
underage sales and drunk driving as opposed to passing 
new laws 
Promoting non-
regulatory initiative  
Promote public information and educational programs 
(generally seen to be ineffective/less effective) as the way 
to tackle alcohol-related harm.  
Promote the ideal of 
evidence-based policy 




area of expertise 
Promote action to address issues outside corporations' 
area of expertise including the smuggling of alcohol, 
campaigns to prevent violence against women, shelters 
for victims of domestic abuse. 
Discursive 
strategies 
Deflect attention and 
descale the problem 
in ways that 
downplay the need 
Distinguish between harms from different levels of 
alcohol consumption and present 'moderate' or 
'responsible' drinking as unharmful and acceptable, 






Emphasise the positive aspects of ‘responsible’ drinking, 
for example that it is compatible with a healthy lifestyle, 
is socially acceptable, and promotes sociability  
Focus policy debates on narrow range of sub-population 
harms, e.g. binge and youth drinking, drink driving; 
drinking in pregnancy; certain areas of the country 
Highlight other critical issues such as “crime, illicit drugs, 
unemployment, poor delivery of health care, lack of 
quality education and economic opportunity” 
  Argue that there is little community concern about 
alcohol marketing 
  State that alcohol consumption is in decline 
Contest the necessity 
and highlight the 
redundancy of 
proposed measures 
Assert that proposed policies are unnecessary as, for 
example, existing regulations are sufficient, the industry 
adheres to own self-regulation codes; Self-regulation is 
working well or is better than formal regulation 
  The proposed policies are unnecessary as existing 
regulation is satisfactory, or existing regulation is 
satisfactory but requires better enforcement 
  Proposed regulations are overly simplistic as, for 
example, price is a blunt instrument, unable to tackle a 
complex social issue like alcohol-related harm; marketing 
restrictions are 'band aid solutions' 
  Warning labels divert attention away from more effective 
programs 
Frame the causes of 
alcohol harms to 
deflect attention / 
shift blame away 
from alcohol sales 
and marketing 
Promote individualized accounts of the nature of alcohol 
problems: consumer behaviour is the source of harm, 
thus unfair to penalize the majority for the actions of the 
few 
Suggest that alcohol misuse is a cultural issue, which 
requires a shift in societal-level norms 
  Highlight issues caused by factors elsewhere in the sales 
process (e.g. preventing individual retailers from offering 
certain price promotions that may be deemed 
irresponsible) or other causes, e.g. genetics 
Challenge the legality 
of policies 
State that the policy infringes law and legal rights of 
company (trademarks, intellectual property, 
constitutionally protected free speech (e.g. referral to US 







Claim industry is a responsible and trustworthy actor, a 
legal industry, different from the tobacco industry;  
concerned corporate citizens with a commitment to 
social goals; does not advertise to youth 
Industry is actively opposed to youth drinking and 
actively encourages responsible drinking 
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Emphasize the independence of the industry-funded 
monitoring and adjudication groups 
  Emphasise the economic importance of the alcohol 






Present public health actors as extremists/authoritarian 
(or neo-prohibitionists) driven by a moral agenda; 
Discredit public health advocates’ opposition or portray 






and the economy 
Claim that 1) the cost of compliance for manufacturers 
will be high/the time required for implementation has 
been underestimated (will result in financial or job 
losses); 2) the regulation is discriminatory/regulation will 
not affect all producers/customers equally (e.g. Excise 
Taxes are regressive, forcing a disproportionate burden 
upon those least able to afford it); 3) the regulation will 
create a barrier to market entry  (limiting innovation and 
competition)1 
Regulation will cause economic/financial problems for 
city, state, country or economic area (e.g. European 
Union), including  financial or job losses (among retailers 
and other associated industries, e.g. printing, advertising, 
leisure) and a decline in public revenue 
  The policy interferes with a free market economy 
  The policy will restrict consumer choice 
Highlight negative 
health consequences 
Regulation will lead to smuggling and associated public 
health issues 
  Regulation may reduce drinking among moderate 
consumers and lead to adverse health outcomes among 
this group  
Question evidence of 
causes of alcohol-
related harms and 
impact of policies 
Question the evidence showing the efficacy of the policy 
and/or argue that there is insufficient evidence that the 
proposed policy will work, or that the evidence is 
inconclusive 
The policy uses inaccurate scientific evidence about the 
causes of the problem 
There is insufficient evidence that the problem is of a 
sufficient scale to justify the intervention 
The evidence shows marketing does not cause or change 
behaviour (it is only used for brand selection and 





























New Zealand to Thailand, 2010: 
“New Zealand was supportive of 
the right of WTO Members to 
introduce new regulations to 
address specific public health 
issues, but concerns remained that 
the proposed labelling 
requirements were unnecessarily 
trade restrictive and that less trade-
restrictive approaches were 
available to achieve the stated 
objective.” (G/TBT/M/50) 
 
EU to South Africa, 2016: "The 
representative of the European 
Union recalled the proposed 
amendments to the regulation that 
were of concern to his delegation. 
The requirement for seven 
different health warnings to be 
rotated during a twelve-month 
cycle constituted an excessive 
burden and a potential technical 
barrier to trade, especially for small 
and medium enterprises. Some 
beverages had a lifespan-after-
labelling of many years and 
predicting which label had to be 
used imposed an unnecessary 
burden on industry." 
(G/TBT/M/68) 










claiming that the 
cost of compliance 
for manufacturers 
will be high 
Australia to Ireland, 2018: 
"Australian exporters were 
concerned about the impact of the 
labelling requirements on their 
business, in particular the cost 
involved in developing bespoke 
labels for the Irish market". 
(G/TBT/M/75) 
 
Australia to Thailand, 2010: "The 
New Zealand representative also 
argued that the new requirements 
would impose significant additional 
costs and administrative burdens 
on exporters..." (G/TBT/M/50) 





















drinkers are the 
primary problem. 
EU to Turkey, 2014: "She [the EU 
representative] also raised a 
concern with the obligation to affix 
on containers of alcoholic 
beverages the message "alcohol is 
not your friend", arguing that it was 
excessive consumption – not any 
consumption – that posed a risk to 
consumer health." (G/TBT/M/61) 
 
Argentina to Ireland, 2018: 
"Argentina believes that the 
requirement to display warning 
messages on the direct link 
between alcohol consumption and 
cancer in a uniform way for 
beverages with different alcoholic 
strengths, without distinguishing 
between abusive and harmful 
consumption on the one hand and 
responsible consumption on the 
other, is disproportionate in 
relation to the legitimate aim of 
protecting human health." 
(G/TBT/M/74)  





the efficacy of the 
policy and/or 
argue that there is 
insufficient 
evidence that the 
proposed policy 
will work, or that 
the evidence is 
inconclusive 
US to India, 2019:  "The US asked 
what evidence India had 
considered when developing the 
required warning statement 
"Consumption of alcohol is 
injurious to health". 
(G/TBT/M/79)  
 
Mexico to Kenya, 2011: "In 
addition, she requested information 
on studies, including those 
supported by the Kenyan 
Government, which justified the 
imposition of the aforementioned 
measures." (G/TBT/M/54) 







regulation for the 
economy  
Canada to Korea, 2019: "The 
representative of Canada said that, 
while Canada and the Canadian 
wine industry supported the goal of 
minimizing the potential harm 
associated with the misuse or abuse 
of alcohol, it was nonetheless 
concerned that this regulation may 
have an impact on trade, especially 
for smaller producers." 
(G/TBT/M/78) 




US to Ireland, 2018: "She stated 
that the bill, if enacted, would 
impact US trade – and that of other 
WTO Members – by requiring 
exporters to produce Ireland-
specific labels, impacting their 
ability to reallocate product in the 
European market." 
(G/TBT/M/74) 






New Zealand to Thailand, 2010: 
"New Zealand supported the right 
of Thailand to regulate to prevent 
alcohol-related harm, but there 
were less trade restricted means of 
pursuing the objective." 
(G/TBT/M/52) 
 
Mexico to Kenya, 2014: "Her 
delegation believed that Kenya 
could apply a less restrictive policy 
to moderate the consumption of 
alcoholic beverages in its territory. 
For example, Kenya could use 
information campaigns as well as 
public policies to control the 
problems of alcohol consumption." 
(G/TBT/M/54)  
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or those with 
addictions 
EU to Turkey, 2014 "The EU 
considered that the measure's 
objective could be better achieved 
through information campaigns 
and consumer education initiatives 
stressing the danger of excessive 
drinking or putting emphasis on 




US to Korea, 2019: "Could Korea 
consider other, less trade-restrictive 
means to achieve its objective, such 
as its domestic initiatives to reduce 
drinking and driving?" 
(G/TBT/M/78) 





behind the policy 
by arguing that the 
policy uses 
inaccurate 
EU to Thailand, 2010: "She asked 
for a clarification on the scientific 
data justifying the assumption that 
the conditions described by the 
health warnings were generally 
caused by any level of alcohol 




about the causes 
of the problem 
consumption, even moderate 
ones". (G/TBT/M/51) 
 
Mexico to Korea, 2017:  "The 
representative of Mexico expressed 
concern raised by domestic 
industry about two of the warning 
messages to be included in the 
labelling of alcoholic beverages, 
which pointed to a causal 
relationship between alcohol 
consumption and cancer by stating 
that: "alcohol is carcinogenic, so 
that excessive drinking causes 
cancer of the liver and the 
stomach" and "excessive drinking 
is the cause of cancer". Mexican 
industry maintained that there was 
no scientific evidence establishing 
such a causal link, since 
epidemiological studies pointed to 
a wide range of cancer risk factors, 
including family history, genetics, 
lifestyle and environmental 
factors." (G/TBT/M/70) 




(generally seen to 
be ineffective/less 
effective) as the 










EU to Kenya, 2011: "The 
representative of the European 
Union enquired whether Kenya 
had considered less burdensome 
alternatives to modify drinking 
behaviour other than mandatory 
health warnings labelling. The 
European Union's experience in 
this area had demonstrated that 
drinking behaviour needed to be 
addressed in a holistic manner. 
Education and information 
activities seemed to be appropriate 
means to address the public health 
objective pursued, and she 
therefore asked Kenya to 
reconsider this measure". 
(G/TBT/M/54) 
 
Mexico to Ireland, 2017: "Ireland 
could fulfill the legitimate objective 
pursued through campaigns to raise 
awareness of the harmful effects on 
health caused by the excessive 
consumption of alcohol." 
(G/TBT/M/71) 





Descale the issue 
by focusing policy 
debates on narrow 
range of sub-
population harms, 





areas of the 
country 
Canada to Turkey, 2014: "Canada 
also asked whether Turkey had 
conducted any studies to 
demonstrate the efficacy of its 
proposed labelling in achieving its 
objectives of educating its 
population on the risks posed by 
alcohol consumption to those 
underage, pregnant, or driving." 
(G/TBT/M/61) 
 
US to Korea, 2019: "The US 
supported several public-private 
partnership initiatives related to 
combating harmful use of alcohol 
and driving under the influence of 
alcohol". (G/TBT/M/79) 
3 8 (3.78%) 
Policy position Promote the 
alcohol industry as 




process and in 





Mexico to Korea, 2017 "Mexico  
requested Korea to...  hold a video 
conference with the Korean 
authorities responsible for the 
measure, in order to clarify the 
nature of the scientific and 
technical information considered in 
connection with its implementation 
and to examine industry's 




US to Korea, 2019 "The US also 
supported several public-private 
partnership initiatives related to 
combating the harmful use of 
alcohol and driving under the 
influence of alcohol". 
(G/TBT/M/78) 






positive aspects of 
‘responsible’ 
drinking and argue 
that it is 
compatible with a 
healthy lifestyle 




Chile to Thailand, 2010: "The 
representative of Chile said regular 
and moderate consumption of wine 
could be beneficial for consumers 
and she suggested a label on 
alcoholic beverages reflecting this 
could be a very useful measure". 
(G/TBT/M/52) 
 
Mexico to Korea, 2017: "Moreover, 
existing scientific literature (studies 
carried out by the US Centers for 
Disease Control and Prevention in 
2011 and the National Institute for 
2 4 (1.89%) 
01/09/2021 
 p.32 
Alcohol Abuse and Alcoholism in 
2013) stressed that moderate 
consumption of alcohol was also 
regarded as an important part of a 
healthy lifestyle." (G/TBT/M/70) 
Discursive 
strategy 
Promote the ideal 
of evidence-based 
policy 
Australia to Korea, 2017: "Australia 
asked if this was the intent of the 
proposed warning statement and 
suggested that the label be drafted 
in a way that would reflect 
scientific consensus on the issue." 
(G/TBT/M/70)  
 
EU to Korea, 2018: "It was 
therefore suggested that Korean 
authorities consider re-drafting the 
health warnings in a way that better 
reflected the fact that alcoholic 
beverages were more likely to cause 
certain diseases when linked with 
higher levels of consumption and 
certain consumption patterns." 
(G/TBT/M/73) 
1 4 (1.89%) 
Discursive 
strategy 
Cite violations of 
international laws, 





Mexico to Turkey, 2014: "Mexico 
asked Turkey to explain the 
scientific basis for the proposed 
measures on packaging, as it 
believed that the measures be a 
violation of intellectual property 
rights." (G/TBT/M/61).  
 
US to Thailand, 2010: "He also 
expressed his delegation's concern 
that the proposed labelling 
requirement could interfere with 
legitimate trademarks on the 
bottle". (G/TBT/M/51) 
3 3 (1.41%) 
Notes:  a-Note that the percentage reported refers to the proportion of the 212 statements which 
contained the argument described in each row, not the percentage of all coded arguments which 
used a given argument. Some statements contained multiple industry arguments, hence the total 




Appendix 6. Summary of key features of discussions on alcohol health warning labelling 
proposals at the TBT Committee 
Member proposing 
alcohol labelling  






Thailand1 Argentina, Australia, Canada, 
Chile, Mexico, New Zealand, 
Switzerland, United States, 
European Union 
2010 2012 7 
Kenya Mexico, United States, 
European Union 
2011 2014 6 
Dominican Republic Mexico, European Union 2012 2012 1 
Israel Argentina, Mexico, United 
States, European Union 
2012 2013 4 
Turkey Canada, Mexico, United 
States, European Union 
2013 2014 2 
Mexico Chile, United States, 
European Union 
2014 2014 1 
India Australia, Canada, Chile, 
Guatemala, Japan, Mexico, 
New Zealand, South Africa, 
Switzerland, United States, 
European Union, Jamaica 
2016 2019 12 
South Africa Canada, Guatemala, 
European Union 
2016 2016 1 
Ireland Guatemala, Mexico, 
Argentina, United States of 
America, Chile, New Zealand, 
Australia 
2016 2019 12 
Korea, Republic of Australia, Canada, Japan, 
Mexico, New Zealand, United 
States of America, European 
Union, Chile 
2016 2019 11 
Notes: Total number of discussions: 57. 1 – this measure was later revised in 2014. However, we 
excluded the revised 2014 regulation from our analysis as it did not include requirements to 














Kenya G/TBT/N/KEN/282 and 
Rev.1 















Israel G/TBT/N/ISR/609 Restriction on advertising and 
marketing of alcoholic beverages, 








COMMUNIQUÉ ON WARNING 
MESSAGES TO BE AFFIXED ON 
THE 





















South Africa G/TBT/N/ZAF/48/Rev.1 South African Government Gazzette  PDF obtained via LSE library (click to view 
document on Google Drive) 
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